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TAKING THE MASS OUT OF MASS TORTS:
REFLECTIONS OF A DALKON SmELD
ARBITRATOR ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, JUDGING, NEUTRALITY,
GENDER, AND PROCESS
Carrie Menkel-Meadow*
I. INTRODUCrION: THE FACrS AND ISSUES
Life in the modem and post-modem world has changed our un-
derstanding of many traditional legal matters. Although many died
from plagues, wars, and some shipping and agricultural accidents in
the years which preceded the Industrial Revolution and modem
breakthroughs in medicine, the twentieth century has given rise to
"group" injury and death -it unprecedented levels, all as we march
toward growth, progress, and greater goods for greater numbers.
Mass progress has resulted in mass injury, which in turn has transformed
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Professor of Law,
UCLA School of Law; Co-Director, UCLA Center on Conflict Resolution;
Chair, CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in Alternative
Dispute Resolution.
As an arbitrator in the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust proceedings, I
heard approximately one hundred cases over a several year period; both my em-
pirical analysis of my own experience and the Private Adjudication Center's
analysis of the entire program await further treatment in the future. The views
expressed in this essay are purely my own and I do not speak for other arbitra-
tors in the program, the Private Adjudication Center, the Dalkon Shield Claim-
ants Trust, or the claimants. Proceedings under the Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion program of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust were confidential and final,
perhaps more so than many other formal court proceedings. Therefore, talking
and writing about them is risky, both because we promise confidentiality and be-
cause you, the reader, have no independent source of verification of what I say
here. As an ethicist, practitioner, theorist, and sometime critic of Alternative
Dispute Resolution processes, I both want to respect the process that I promised
to be a part of and publicly analyze it so we can learn for future proceedings.
Thanks to Robin L. West, Robert Meadow, Herbert Kritcer, Neff Vid-
mar, and Elena Ro for comments, readings, and conversations about what fol-
lows.
514 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:513
individualized justice into mass justice.! Whether structured as large
class actions or as thousands of individual cases dealing with the same
accident, product, or chemical, lawsuits claiming compensation for
the harms caused by the fruits of production of a mass industrialized
society proliferate in our legal system and challenge many of the ba-
sic tenets of American, adversarial, common law adjudication.
Attempts to aggregate claims have led to multidistrict consoli-
dations, class actions, federal-state coordination committees of law-
yers and judges, organized claims facilities, and bankruptcy proceed-
ings. Whether before, during, or after the pendency of litigation,
cases of mass injury increasingly use various forms of Alternative
Dispute Resolution ("ADR") to help assess global costs and liabili-
ties. Further, parties use ADR to provide some form of an indi-
vidualized assessment of either the legal merits and liability, or the
amount of compensation to be paid to particular claimants or victims,
or in some cases all three.3
This essay is part of the story of the mass injury suits that turned
to ADR as one way to individually process many cases. The story of
the Dalkon Shield litigation has been told in several other places4 and
I will not repeat it here except as necessary to understand the issues I
raise.
When the A.H. Robins Company chose bankruptcy as the way
of dealing with its liability for the manufacture of the intrauterine
1. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts:
When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1159, 1161 (1995).
2. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997); LINDA S.
MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION (1996); JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL
JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION (1995).
3. For a more in-depth review of the different kinds of mass tort cases and
the uses of different forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR"), see
MARK A. PETERSON & MOLLY SELVIN, RESOLUTION OF MASS TORTS:
TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF AGGREGATIVE PROCEDURES 39-
48 (1988); Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use
of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L.
REv. 1587 (1995); Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding
Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961
(1993); and Francis E. McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in
Mass Tort Litigation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1851 (1997).
4. See, e.g., RONALD J. BACIGAL, THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION: THE
DALKON SHIELD CONTROVERSY (1990); RONALD J. BACIGAL, MAY IT PLEASE
THE COURT: A BIOGRAPHY OF JUDGE ROBERT R. MERHIGE (1992); KAREN M.
HICKS, SURVIVING THE DALKON SHIELD IUD: WOMEN V. THE PHARMA-
CEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1994); MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST (1984); RICHARD
B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD
BANKRUPTCY (1991).
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device ("IUD"), known as the Dalkon Shield, it established a settle-
ment fund of $2.3 billion to compensate thousands of women and
men who claimed injuries resulting from the use of the device.5
Women's injuries included unwanted pregnancies, ectopic pregnan-
cies, septic abortions, miscarriages, birth defects, excessive bleeding
and cramping, pelvic inflammatory disease, infertility, and, in a few
cases, death. Men's injuries included loss of consortium and related
claims.6
Most of the physical injuries were due to the peculiar "wicking"
action of the string7 which extended from the crab-like device, allow-
ing removal by the physician. The string of the Dalkon Shield was
particularly susceptible to allowing bacteria to climb or to be wicked
into the uterus, causing dangerous, but often silent, infections.8 In
addition, the distinctive prongs of the Dalkon Shield often became
embedded in the uterus, causing pain and bleeding. Finally, as later
became an issue in the litigation, inadequate testing of the device 9-
and then failure to disclose some of the findings of internal corporate
tests-prevented accurate dissemination of the medical risks and the
actual efficacy rate of pregnancy prevention."°
In addition to these physical injuries, the problems they caused
led to several significant psychic harms for many, if not all, women.
Some suffered troubled or broken marriages due to their infertility"
5. For more complete descriptions of the process which led to the estab-
lishment of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust ("Trust") see Kenneth R. Fein-
berg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1990)
and Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust7 Paradigm Lost (or
Found)?, 61 FORDiIAM L. REV. 617 (1992).
6. See Vairo, supra note 5, at 625.
7. See SOBOL, supra note 4, at 10-11.
8. See id. at 2.
9. The Intrauterine Device ("IUD"), as a "device" and not a drug, was not
subject to certain Federal Drug Administration premarketing testing require-
ments in 1970. See id. at 4.
10. This was a crucial factor in the mass use of the Dalkon Shield. Touted as
a highly effective contraceptive, the Dalkon Shield became a birth control device
of choice at the time when the first studies of dangerous side effects of the birth
control pill were released. In the cases I heard as an arbitrator, a majority of
Dalkon Shields had been inserted in university and college student health offices
or in Planned Parenthood health clinics. The Dalkon Shield was a mass device,
aggressively marketed to take advantage of the new sexual freedom of women in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. By the time the product was withdrawn from the
market, A.H. Robins Company had distributed approximately 2.8 million
Dalkon Shields in the United States. See Vairo, supra note 5, at 625.
11. In one case I heard a woman aborted a pregnancy conceived while using
the Dalkon Shield, due to fear of damage to the fetus. She never conceived
January 1998]
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or due to their conception of an unwanted child; many developed fear
of sexual intercourse due to pain from the Dalkon Shield or fear of
unwanted pregnancy and its aftermath. 12 Even years after removal of
the Dalkon Shield, some women were fearful of any public appear-
ances, including going to work, after excessive bleeding had led to
humiliating experiences.13 For many women the use of the Dalkon
Shield produced an anxiety or fear about sexuality, reproduction, re-
lationships, and other significant harms.
At least one commentator has recognized these harms as
"gendered harms' '14 that largely have been ignored or undercompen-
sated in our gendered, pragmatic, instrumentalist, and male-
identified tort system. 5 Furthermore, for many women the fear of
again.
12. While abortion was legalized in the United States during the period of
Dalkon Shield use, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), some women faced
unwanted pregnancies before this period and had to grapple with the decision of
whether to obtain illegal abortions, as well as whatever religious, moral, and per-
sonal guilt they felt about abortion generally. I heard cases of women who were
not in the United States, but were in regimes where abortion was not legal.
These women either had to obtain unlawful abortions, incur travel and other ex-
penses to reach nations where abortion was legal, or bear children that were, for
any number of complicated reasons, unwanted or unmanageable at the time of
conception.
Consider how the vagaries of territorial legality differentially affects the
victims of mass torts. In some places, women who conceived due to the failure of
the falsely advertised protection of the Dalkon Shield could not legally abort
their unwanted fetuses and also did not have a legal claim for "wrongful life." In
other jurisdictions women could legally abort their pregnancies at some mone-
tary expense and at varying degrees of psychic cost. Only in very few jurisdic-
tions could a woman have collected the expenses of child bearing, but not of
child rearing, for wrongful life claims. Many who have judged or commented on
mass torts have decried the variation in legal compensation based on the differ-
ences in state law in what are national or even global torts. See In re DES Cases,
789 F. Supp. 552, 562, 576-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying and broadening rules of
personal jurisdiction to include the expectation that manufacturers of nationally
marketed and distributed products should expect to be sued wherever the prod-
ucts are used, and commenting in dicta on the nature of global distribution of
products and the liability that should flow therefrom).
13. In one case I heard that a bride's wedding dress was ruined with blood
due to excessive bleeding.
14. See ROBIN L. WEsT, CARING FOR JUSTICE 97 (1997).
15. See id.; Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81,
82 (1987); see also Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re) Torts: Thoughts on the Liability
Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 850-53(1990) (discussing the implications of a feminist tort system); Leslie Bender, A
Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 3, 4-5 (1988)(discussing the components of feminist theory); Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in
the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. &
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cross-examination on past sexual history-like the cross-examination
used by A.H. Robins Company's defense counsel to demonstrate an
alternative theory of causation for pelvic inflammatory disease-the
actual conduct of the cross-examination in depositions and trials was
experienced as another layer of harm. The harm is like the claim of
rape victims that the defendant's trial is often experienced as a sec-
ond rape of the victim. Thus, for some women, the very structure of
the legal process added to the harm and injury experienced in the use
of the product.16
The Dalkon Shield story is also an interesting and poignant hu-
man story, as are all mass tort stories, with the characteristic tragedy
of modem life. It is the story of medical design failure, fueled by the
ironic joint hopes of the social and sexual revolutionaries of the
1960s, who were quite literally in bed with the corporate profit sought
by those who desired capitalizing on social change." Although it is
FEMINISM 41, 41-42 (1989) (discussing the reasons for including feminist theory
and women's injuries in a torts course).
It would be an interesting empirical study to compare whether the sol-
diers exposed to Agent Orange feel that they were treated any better than the
would-be mothers who used the Dalkon Shield or were exposed to Diethylstilbe-
strol ("DES"). See CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DE-
MOCRACY, FEMINISM, AND POLITICAL THEORY 10-12 (1989) (arguing that
women's child bearing should be recognized as an act of citizenship commensu-
rate with men's soldiering).
16. See HICKS, supra note 4, at 104 (discussing how lawyers promote victim-
blaming ideologies and trivialize injuries). Not all women feared public legal
hearings. In any mass tort case or large class action lawsuit for social change,
there will be courageous individuals who are willing to take the stand and go
public with their stories, even with often difficult and- painful cross-examination
experiences, so that the larger story may be known.
As I argue, the fact that women, like all human beings, have different
preferences, desires, needs, and capacities for privacy or publicity, suggests that
any one way to process mass torts may ill serve victims. Varieties of process,
such as a fuller menu of ADR, may better serve the tort victims as well as meet
their substantive and compensatory needs. As in medicine, there may be several
choices of treatment. After a recent angioplasty-rather than a coronary by-
pass-noted mediator and litigator Michael Keating remarked that if surgery is
like trial, then angioplasty is the ADR of cardiac care. There is less wear and
tear, lower cost, lower risk, and less disability when it can be utilized. See Mi-
chael Keating, Remarks at the Spring Meeting of CPR-Institute for Dispute
Resolution in Vancouver, British Columbia (June 24, 1997).
17. I cannot resist, in what I consider to be a mixture of personal essay and
law review commentary, naming the irony of this "joint venture." In the middle
of writing this piece I returned, for personal reasons, to Richmond, Virginia-the
home of the Dalkon Shield and the A.H. Robins Company. How odd it seemed
to me that this town and this company benefited so greatly from the birth control
practices, which clearly much of this community must have abhorred, of young
people all over the nation and the world. At the time the Dalkon Shield was
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true that the Dalkon Shield was most easily used by women who had
already borne children, it was widely prescribed and inserted by phy-
sicians working in university student health facilities. These univer-
sity facilities were where the first pioneers of the sexual revolution
began their work for a more free and more active sexual youth, un-
precedented by any previous generation. With the typical American
faith in medical and technical progress, millions of women were quick
to avail themselves of all that the new market would offer. Although
the total toll of all mass torts on the two genders is yet to be calcu-
lated,"8 it is clear that those mass torts resulting from reproductive
medicine fall disproportionately on women.
When the potential liability from thousands of lawsuits became
too great, the A.H. Robins Company filed for "reorganization relief"
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in its hometown of Rich-
mond, Virginia.19 Federal District Judge Robert Merhige retained
jurisdiction over the entire case.? The reorganization plan-which
marketed, Richmond was a very conservative and religious Virginia city. Mod-
em sexual practices and the prevention of pregnancies were not likely favored
policies there. The vast majority of the Dalkon Shields that were the subject of
the hearings I heard were provided through university student health facilities
and urban Planned Parenthood clinics.
Today the city and University of Richmond are endowed with many large
and gracious buildings provided by the Robins family, most of whose profits are
due to the widely successful cough syrup Robitussen and Chapstick, and proba-
bly not to the Dalkon Shield. Indeed, the Robins family management probably
wishes it had never purchased the Dalkon Shield from its Baltimore inventor.
Nevertheless, it is somewhat ironic and interesting to note the magic that capital-
ism performs when it brings together suppliers and purchasers who may share
little in their fundamental values but are willing to make a mutually beneficial
commercial exchange.
- 18. Until the final number of tobacco injuries are known, it is difficult to
know with any degree of accuracy whether either gender has been dispropor-
tionately injured in mass tort events. It is interesting to note that many of the
mass torts have themselves been quite gendered. Asbestos, heart valve, and
Agent Orange are primarily "men's" torts, while DES, Dalkon Shield, and breast
implants are obviously "women's" torts. Many commentators on reproductive
medicine note that the harms of birth control and birth clearly and dispropor-
tionately have been visited upon women. There is little development in male in-
trusive birth control measures, such as IUDs and the chemistry of the pill or
Norplant, causing some to complain about the medical violence done to women.
See HIcKs, supra note 4, at 15.
19. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 86 F.3d 364,367 (4th Cir. 1996).
20. See id. at 368. I will not deal here with the controversial issues surround-
ing Judge Merhige's role, including his relationship to the Robins family, to the
Richmond economy, and his control of the bankruptcy case, as these issues have
been recounted by others. See sources cited supra note 4. For many, Judge
Merhige had been considered a fair, innovative, and committed judge in the Vir-
ginia school desegregation cases. To the extent that this essay raises issues about
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involved, among other things, the financing of the Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust ("Trust") primarily from the acquisition of A.H.
Robins Company by American Home Products-provided for sev-
eral options for claims to be filed and for payment by the Trust.
21
These options included: (1) small short form payments with a simple
application process, (2) more complicated forms and processes where
liability was less clear or desired compensation was higher, and (3) a
process for attending a settlement conference with a Trust represen-
tative, followed by a choice of trial or binding arbitration if settle-
ment offers were rejected.
Settlement offers were made on the basis of pre-bankruptcy
petition historical settlement amounts, as calculated by a special mas-
ter and experts during an estimation process supervised by the court.
There was much acrimony, which I will not review here, as to selec-
tion of the trustees to administer the Trust and a variety of other le-
gal issues. These issues are important in the larger consideration of
whether justice was finally done, both in the process and in the out-
come achieved through the Dalkon Shield claims process, but I will
leave that assessment to another day.
As part of the Option (3) choice of settlement or trial, the Trust
developed a fast-track arbitration process which it misnamed, in my
view, ADR. As used in the Trust rules, ADR was simply a faster,
even less formal, form of arbitration, allowing testimony of experts
by affidavits and medical texts. There was no mediation, negotiation,
or further attempt to engage in conversation with the Trust represen-
tatives. If a claimant rejected a settlement offer and proceeded to
ADR, she was electing an adversarial trial-like hearing, albeit not in
a court. The claims representatives had absolutely no authority to
negotiate or "talk" to the claimants. When a case came to ADR, it
came for decision and award.
The Trust contracted with the Private Adjudication Center
("PAC"), an affiliate of Duke University School of Law, to be the
third party neutral under the reorganization plan and to administer
the ADR and arbitration process.22 In turn, PAC trained a cadre of
arbitrators throughout the country to serve as hearing officers. These
arbitrators included retired trial judges and some lawyers with at
least ten years of significant trial experience. No one who had used
neutrality, fairness, and personal involvement with the issues, Judge Merhige's
concerns and commitments to his community are another example of the com-
plexity of the judge's role.
21. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 86 F.3d at 369.
22. See Feinberg, supra note 5, at 108 n.85.
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or who had an immediate family member who had used the Dalkon
Shield was eligible to serve as an arbitrator.' Further, no one who
had been involved in the on-going litigation was eligible either.24
Arbitrators were trained in the relevant law, in the rules of the Trust
for conducting the hearing and for liability,' and by a gynecologist on
23. There was a recent effort to recuse a federal district judge from a breast
implant case in which he acknowledged that his wife had breast implants and
therefore he was technically a member of the class of litigants. The judge failed
to remove himself under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. He stated that he could stilljudge the case impartially, despite familial and potential economic interests, as
well as "extrajudicial knowledge" or views about the larger case. See Plaintiffs'
Motion to Disqualify Judge Robert Jones, McAleer v. Medical Eng'g Corp., No.
CV-97-10158-2 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (denying the disqualification motion brought by
plaintiff). This suggests that the disqualification rules for arbitrators were more
stringent than the federal statute of judicial disqualification, under which at least
some judges have ruled on their own potential interests and biases.
24. At the time of the selection of the initial arbitrators, there were concerns,
relevant to this essay, about the gender composition of the arbitration panels.
Under the traditional arbitration option, claimants and the Trust could strike
arbitrators. I was trained in the initial group in southern California where there
was only one other woman in my training cohort. Within the rules for arbitra-
tion, it would have been possible, had the Trust wanted to, to strike either or
both of us so that there would have been no women on cases in this region. I be-
lieve there were similar issues in other regions.
The staff of the Private Adjudication Center ("PAC") was duly sensitive
to this issue and over the years many women were added to the arbitrator lists.
In fact, when the ADR "fast-track" arbitration process was created, the PAC
chose the arbitrators and there were many women, as well as men, chosen.
Therefore, the possibility of an all male corps of arbitrators never developed. I
handled the first set of ADR proceedings in this country, which were monitored
by the Trust and its Executive Director, Michael Sheppard.
25. There were relatively complex liability rules for the arbitration hearings
about what the Trust admitted and what was still subject to contest. Proof of use
was required, but causation was far more complicated. In the ADR proceedings,
amounts of compensation were limited initially to $10,000 per claimant and then
raised to $20,000. Subsequently, after all claims were paid, each claimant would
receive pro rata additions. There have already been some pro rata additional
payments to those who were compensated through this process. There were a
variety of far more complicated legal issues, which I, as a law professor, saw in
these proceedings which I will not deal with here, but which should be consid-
ered in future global settlements like these.
The instrument setting up the Trust and the rules promulgated by the
bankruptcy court, approved by District Judge Merhige, provided that Virginia
law was to govern legal claims. However, many of the lawyers representing
claimants continued to insist that the proceedings were occurring in their juris-
dictions and that under diversity jurisdiction their state substantive rules were to
apply. In California, for example, certain forms of wrongful life claims were rec-
ognized as a matter of tort law, where they were not recognized in Virginia. Un-
der the ADR rules, once chosen by the claimant as a process, all awards by arbi-
trators were final and binding and not subject to review. I used to say about my
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the reproductive medicine necessary to understand the causation and
injury issues.
There is much I could say as a law professor about the legal pro-
ceedings. Was the bankruptcy device appropriately used? Were the
conflicts of law issues adequately dealt with? Was there adequate
representation and negotiation for the settlement amounts? Were
the liability and process issues properly handled? Finally, was justice
done in the winding up of this mass tort, one of the few to come to fi-
nal legal closure?
Many of these issues have been canvassed by others, with refer-
ence to this case or with respect to others like it, such as in the asbes-
tos and breast implant litigations. I have views on these subjects,'
but here I choose to focus on two different and more difficult aspects
of the use of ADR in mass torts based on my own participant-
observer experience2V Both of the issues I will address here are con-
troversial and will no doubt inspire disagreement. However, I raise
these issues because I think it is important to air them openly and in
role as a Dalkon Shield arbitrator that I felt as powerful as a Supreme Court
Justice. Virtually no one could review my rulings. There were several appeals
filed both with Judge Merhige and with the Fourth Circuit on issues having to do
with the ADR and arbitration process, all of which were unsuccessful. See, e.g.,
In re A.H. Robins Co., 86 F.3d at 364 (4th Cir. 1996).
26. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
27. Whether cast as sociological participant observation or more jurispru-
dential phenomenological accounts of judging processes, we have a growing lit-
erature which seeks to explore and understand the process of judging from in-
side. See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1921); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS (1960); Shirley S. Abrahamson et al., Judges on Judging: A
Bibliography, 24 St. MARY'S L.J. 995, 995-97 (1993); Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Judging in the Quiet of the Storm, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 965, 965-93 (1993); Jerome
Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 U. ILL. L. REv. 645 (1932); Duncan Kennedy,
Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J.
LEGAL EDuC. 518 (1986); Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How
Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357 (1925); Charles Yablon, Justifying the Judge's
Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 231 (1990).
This essay is at least a partial phenomenological account of an ADR
process. This Article discusses a particularized form of ADR within the specific
context of a mass tort with multiple layers of rules. Later in this Article, I sug-
gest that our accounts of decision-making, judging, and in the case of ADR, fa-
cilitating might more rigorously explore the differences between fact-finding and
lawmaking or the interpretation and application of rules and precedents. Now
added to the analysis are the different third party neutral roles performed by
mediators or other judicial-like officers. Much may turn on differences in: ethics
and rules of disqualification; choice of the decision-maker, as in some forms of
ADR; qualities and attributes necessary for the tasks; competencies; strategies
and quality of the decision-making processes and the outcomes.
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print and not just in the corridors of hearing rooms and conference
halls.'
First, when properly used, ADR can take the "mass" out of mass
torts and make big cases small again in a positive, more human way.
ADR can provide an individualized treatment of cases, which is an
important part of the judgment of disputants when they evaluate
whether they were treated fairly. As we now know from the proce-
dural justice literature, it is not just outcome that matters. How
people perceive the fairness of the processes they endure is a major
determinant of how they feel the legal system has treated them.29 I
28. In this era of political correctness, on both ends of the political spectrum,
and close scrutiny of the written word, it is difficult to talk about these issues in
print. Those who would hold public office or perform other forms of public
service-such as a government official, judge, private mediator, or arbitrator-
must be careful about what they say in public. On the basis of their academic
writings, Judge Bork was denied confirmation as a Supreme Court Justice and
Lani Guinier's nomination as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights was
withdrawn.
Some years ago I was privileged to participate in an important conference
on the role of women in the judiciary at the University of Pennsylvania's Annen-
berg Public Policy Center, on March 14, 1995. Supreme Court Justices Sandra
Day O'Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsberg, as well as several other important fed-
eral and state judges, spoke about whether the participation of women in the ju-
diciary had "transformed the image of justice." Most, if not all, of the judges and
justices were quite reluctant to discuss explicitly the influences of their gender on
their decision-making. When one of the federal judges simply mentioned how
her brethren had treated her when she first joined the bench, it made the news
the next day. See Howard Goodman, Female Judges Tell Audience at Penn of
Balancing Acts, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 15, 1995, at 2.
Now that I am writing about the effect of my gender on my role as a pri-
vate arbitrator in a very gendered mass tort, I have come to understand their re-
luctance. I want to talk about these important issues. I believe I am a fair, com-
petent, good, and compassionate arbitrator, but I worry that what I say will lead
some to question my neutrality or objectivity in the conventional, traditional, and
sometimes misunderstood ways in which we define these terms for legal decision-
makers.
Over the years only a very few women judges have bravely spoken out on
some of these issues with honesty and great integrity. See generally Shirley S.
Abrahamson, The Woman Has Robes: Four Questions, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REv. 489 (1984); Gladys Kessler, National Association of Women Judges, 14
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 473 (1984); Patricia M. Wald, The Role of Morality in
Judging: A Woman Judge's Perspective, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 3 (1986); Patricia M.
Wald, Some Real Life Observations About Judging, 26 IND. L. REv. 173 (1992);
Patricia M. Wald, Women in the Law: Stage Two, 52 UMKC L. REv. 45 (1983);
Bertha Wilson, Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?, 28 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 507 (1990). I will refer to some of their work in this Article. It is
worth noting that the Honorable Bertha Wilson was the first of three women
justices on the Supreme Court of Canada.
29. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
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join Judge Weinstein in my belief, based on experience, that cathar-
sis-an ability to tell one's story, to know that someone will hear it,
to know that what one has suffered is meaningful,0 even though pain-
ful-is an important part of how we must deal with mass torts. Set-
tlements and even some forms of adjudication and ADR that do not
take this basic human need into account will be found wanting, at
least by some claimants. When well-constructed, ADR may be a use-
ful way to provide justice and some meaning to those who suffer from
injuries caused in our mass society. This is especially true when
ADR allows for proper "voice," "party control," "hearing," and
other basic characteristics of processes that are valued by its partici-
pants.
Second, my recognition that catharsis and empathic hearings
matter, if ADR is going to be fair and meaningful, exposes a far more
controversial point. Who the third party neutral is may matter a lot
and may make a difference whether the process used is arbitration or
mediation. In short, I want to deconstruct the meaning of neutrality
to interrogate its teachings in the particularity of this story, and for
the more general story of neutrality or impartiality in particular
forms of judging.' This particular story is one of gendered injury.
Thus, here the deconstruction of neutrality or lack of bias is focused
on the gendered nature of harm and hurt,3  and what role gender-
and similar demographic, identity, or experience based filters-may
play in the judging.'
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 61-66 (1988); Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective
on the Settlement of Mass Tort Claims, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 203-04(1990); see also JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 6-16 (1975) (reviewing the first laboratory-like
studies of parties' procedural preferences).
30. For a fascinating, rich, and deeply textured exploration of how we cate-
gorize, socially construct, and use human suffering for a variety of purposes, see
ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, FRUITS OF SORROW 3-14 (1997).
31. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 9-11.
32. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE)
180-212 (1997); Kennedy, supra note 27, at 518; John Leubsdorf, Theories of
Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 237, 238-40 (1987).
33. See WEST, supra note 14, at 94-178; Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Femi-
nist Theory and Tort, supra note 15, at 15-27; Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts:
Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, supra
note 15, at 888-94.
34. See Patricia A. Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist The-
ory and Judging, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1945, 1946-48 (1988); Homer C. La Rue, The
Ethics of Disclosures by Arbitrators of Color: Have the Rules Changed?, 42 LAB.
L.J. 619, 623-26 (1991); Judith Resnik, Feminism and the Language of Judging, 22
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 31, 32 (1990); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsidera-
tions of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1877, 1883-86 (1988).
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II. THE USE OF ADR PROCESSES IN MASS TORTS
Much ink has been spilled on the difficult procedural, substan-
tive, and policy questions implicated in how we are to compensate
the victims of a growing variety of mass injuries. These injuries range
from mass accidents, such as plane crashes, hotel fires, or building
collapses in which many people are hurt simultaneously, to more
gradual and individualistic injuries that come from the use of medical
products or drugs, like the heart valve, Bendectin, the Dalkon Shield,
or Diethylstilbestrol ("DES"). Injuries now include the more insidi-
ous and the very gradual injuries resulting from diseases like cancer.
These injuries often come from prolonged exposure to substances
whose dangers may not be known at the time of use, such as with as-
bestos, dioxin, and electromagnetic fields; or as we recently learned,
known to some but not others, as with tobacco and Agent Orange.
The question of what was known by whom and at what stage of
product or chemical use has become one of the most gripping human
mystery stories of modern life. It is a story complicated by the fasci-
nating journalistic reports of these tales and further entangled by the
more complex story that legal liability, risk analysis, and causation
rules require.35 Will breast implant epidemiology turn the Dow
Coming case into another Bendectin story or will it eventually be-
come more like the stories of DES, asbestos, and tobacco?
In his important article on the temporal legal development of
mass tort cases, Professor Francis E. McGovern argues for several
methods of compensation for mass tort victims once a tort has
"matured" in litigation.6 A tort matures when there is enough expe-
Judge Wald has commented that women judges will be particularly im-portant in legal issues implicating gender, such as domestic disputes, family law,
employment discrimination, some criminal matters, and some torts. However,
she recognizes that women's experiences and insights will also be important for
other, non-obviously gender-related cases and for the judiciary itself. See Wald,Women in the Law: Stage Two, supra note 28, at 49 (cautioning women lawyers
not to suppress the instinctive reactions that they fear will be labeled "soft" or
"overemotional"); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Le-gal Theory, 23 PAC. L.J. 1493, 1495 (1992); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Women'sWays of "Knowing" Law: Feminist Legal Epistemology, Pedagogy, and Juris-
prudence, in KNOWLEDGE, DIFERENCE, AND POWER 57, 66-68 (Nancy Gold-berger et al. eds., 1996) (illustrating examples of how feminist analysis has af-fected traditional legal doctrine and legal categories).
35. See generally Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liabilityfor Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REv. 439 (1990); Christopher H. Schroeder,Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law, 38 UCLA L. REV. 143(1990).
36. See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U.
L. REv. 659 (1989).
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rience with the damage caused by injury and enough cases litigated or
settled to establish an economic value for these types of cases. In
cases involving mature torts, experts have been employed to help
evaluate the cases and develop the appropriate valuations and grids
for settlement 7 Several mature torts were handled this way, includ-
ing the Dalkon Shield case and claims involving asbestos, breast im-
plants, and likely now tobacco. However, it is also true that we have
begun to think about processing mass torts sooner.
Now, we are trying to develop the methods of process and the
amounts for payments before a tort is legally mature. In some re-
spects the settlement of the Agent Orange litigation was such a case.
Judge Weinstein clearly thought the plaintiffs' causation proof was
weak, but he was determined to see that compensation would be paid
to veterans who were suffering. 9 Some also think that the proposed
breast implant settlement-until Dow Corning's bankruptcy filing
radically altered the procedural landscape-was an "early" or
"premature" tort. Some saw it as an effort by the manufacturers to
avoid mass litigation by settling up even before all the liabilities were
clear and putting the financial burdens behind them as companies.
For those plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys willing to agree, it was a
way to avoid the time, expense, and, once again, the painful and em-
barrassing tales of women's injuries that would have to be exposed.'
At the other end of the temporal spectrum, one might consider
37. See id. at 684-85.
38. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 857-58
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), affd 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
39. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 3-4, 62.
40. As in the Dalkon Shield cases, the breast implant cases require some
women to testify to very personal and painful details about their lives and bodies.
Many women who received breast implants had not told their families or loved
ones that they had done so; and if they had known they would be required to
testify in order to claim compensation for either already manifested injuries, or
potential future injuries, they might not have chosen litigation.
I served briefly as a consultant to the settlement process, in which we at-
tempted to design a counseling procedure to inform claimants about their settle-
ment options. We had to take account of the fact that many women would not
want to attend mass public meetings to learn about their rights if it meant appear-
ing in a public forum, particularly in the community in which they lived. In other
mass tort cases, public relations consultants have been brought in to design home
videos, computer software, and telephone hot lines as other ways of informing
claimants and privately communicating messages about legal rights and remedies
that in non-mass settings might have been better performed by individual lawyers.
In many recent mass torts, the claimants have effectively formed their
own support groups. In the case of asbestos, traditional union facilities have
been utilized for such functions. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 57-61.
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the tobacco cases in which injuries are clearly mature in the physical,
if not legal, sense. If the current proposed settlement, or some varia-
tion on its themes, goes forward, it will in a sense also be an early
mass tort. That is, compensation rates will be paid from agreed-upon
regularized grids of benefits, rather than being based on years of liti-
gation or settlement values.
One might say that mass torts have themselves matured en
masse. Perhaps we have learned enough from the aggregation of
claims in those cases, which have run the fuller gamut of litigation
and settlement, that when a new one erupts on the scene ' the masters
of the mass torts42 are prepared to spring into action. These masters
stand ready to act, with tools for evaluating claims and formulas for
computing market shares, compensation schemes, alternative proc-
esses, and attorney fee schedules.4 Often even before litigation is
41. Many of us who work in this field wonder what modem product, chemi-
cal, or new technology will emerge next with its human harms and potential for
attorney fees. Mass torts have proven to be a growth industry, as specialists in
one area have quickly moved to another. Having mastered the medicine of lungs
in asbestos litigation, plaintiff lawyer Ron Motley, among others, has become a
big player in the tobacco litigation. For others who learned about the toxicity of
fibers, there may be a new world of litigation waiting in the asbestos substitutes,
which, like fiberglass, may very well turn out to have some similar properties.
Similarly, newly styled women's health experts jump from DES to Dalkon Shield
to breast implants, despite the fact that the actual physiological damages in these
cases are quite different. For a discussion of the newest mass torts, see Richard
B. Schmitt, Feeding Frenzy: Trial Lawyers Rush to Turn Diet-Pill Ills into Money
in the Bank, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 1997, at Al.
42. I cannot resist suggesting that this small band of mass tort experts some-
times thinks of themselves as "masters of the universe." Even Judge Weinstein,
who has repeatedly appointed the same masters, wishes that there was a broader
base of individuals to choose from. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 109-10(arguing that the small number of special masters may lead to conflicts of interest
and suggesting that a special code of ethics may be required where masters work
in the interstices of judging and lawyering). Several commentators and Gender
Bias Task Force Reports have remarked on the overwhelming use of a small
cadre of individuals, virtually all men, who serve in such capacities. See Report of
the Special Committee on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias Task Force in the D.C.
Circuit, 84 GEo. L.J. 1657, 1680 (1996) (commenting specifically on the gender
composition of court's special masters); Judith Resnik, Gender Bias: From
Classes to Courts, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2195,2196-201 (1993); The Effects of Gender
in the Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task
Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 745 (1994).
43. Outside of the mass tort area, but in the related area of mass consumer
and securities class actions, it is interesting to note that when a formula for set-
tlement is used successfully in one case, see Leslie Scism, Prudential Restitution
Could Top $1.6 Billion, WALL ST. J., May 30, 1997, at A3; Settlement Approved
in Prudential Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1997, at D4, it almost instantaneously is
used in similar cases against other defendants, until a court rejects the particular
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filed in some areas of specialized practice, such as construction de-
fects, committees of interest are formed, mediators are hired, and a
structured settlement process is underway.'M
The definitive history of mass torts has yet to be written45 and the
policy and scholarly discussions of how mass torts should be managed
continue in debates that range from case consolidation and multidis-
trict management," to judicial settlement intervention,47 to class actions,
to bankruptcy, and to new administrative mechanismsM with an occa-
mass settlement scheme, as occurred in the General Motors Trucking case. See
In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 822 (3d Cir. 1995).
44. Dispute resolution organizations like the PAC, JAMS-Endispute, the
Center for Public Resources Industry-Specific Panels, and the American Arbi-
tration Association now have all developed great expertise and sophistication in
structuring mass tort and products liability settlement procedures, perhaps sur-
passing the abilities and capacities of courts to organize and manage such cases.
See Symposium, Claims Resolution Facilities and the Mass Settlement of Mass
Torts, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1990); Task Force on Alternative Dispute
Resolution, Recommendations by the American Arbitration Association (March
1997).
45. We do have a series of excellent journalistic accounts of some of the ma-jor mass torts. However, almost all of them tend to be told by writers more in-
formed by one side than the other and it is usually the plaintiffs' side. See, e.g.,
PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT (1985) (discussing asbestos);
JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995) (discussing water pollution in
Woburn, Massachusetts); RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES (1996)(discussing the role of the tobacco industry in the tobacco litigation); SOBOL, su-
pra note 4 (discussing the bankruptcy reorganization of the company manufac-
turing the Dalkon Shield IUD); GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK
DISASTER (1976) (discussing a coal mine flood disaster); see also PHIL BROWN &
EDWIN J. MIKKELSEN, No SAFE PLACE: ToXIc WASTE, LEUKEMIA, AND
COMMUNITY ACTION 1-6 (1990) (discussing the sociological accounts of the
community effects of some mass torts); KAI ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH:
DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN TE BUFFALO CREEK FLOOD (1976)
(discussing the community effects of mass torts). There are a growing number of
more scholarly accounts of the legal and social issues in mass torts, see e.g.,
MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF
MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 96-147 (1996); JOSEPH SANDERS, FROM
SCIENCE TO EVIDENCE: THE TESTIMONY ON CAUSATION IN THE BENDICTIN
CASE (1992); PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 1-15 (1987);
WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at xi-xvii (reflecting on the many mass tort cases he has
handled).
46. See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Man-
aging Complex Litigation, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 440, 449-56 (1986) (discussing new
case management techniques).
47. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 2; SCHUCK, supra note 45. Cf. David Luban,
Heroic Judging in an Anti-heroic Age 97 Colum. L. Rev 2064 (commenting on
Judge Weinstein's settlement activities as a judge at many mass torts, in Sympo-
sium on Judge Weinstein's legacy as a judge).
48. Judge Weinstein, for example, has proposed a National Disaster Court,
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sional mention of some ADR.
I would like to suggest that while we are looking for a single fix
to the claimed litigation explosion and the particular problems that
mass torts present, it is now clear that we will have to use a variety of
techniques depending on several factors. These factors include: the
nature of the injuries, whether death, long-term disability, latency,
medical monitoring, loss of consortium, etc.; the science of causation;
the relative numbers of defendants; the depth of the defendant's
pockets; the numbers of claimants; and the fee structures of their
lawyers.49
It is not clear that one size will fit all torts. Defendants who de-
cide to contest liability may need to use different techniques to assess
causation, rather than concede it or seek to pay anyway in order to
avoid more extensive litigation costs and bad publicity. Different
kinds of settlements will need to be structured depending on whether
the injury is complete, as unfortunately with death or with time-
limited injury, or is latent, requiring continuing care or medical moni-
toring; whether a single source will finance all payments, such as with
a single defendant; or whether claims assessment will be based on
market share or other principles, as with the Asbestos Claims Facil-
ity. Settlements will also depend on whether amounts of claims are
finite or can be changed at different times, depending either on
changed injuries or numbers of claimants, such as in the back-end
opt-out provisions of the proposed breast implant settlement.'
What is clear to me from my involvement as an arbitrator in the
Dalkon Shield cases is that in some of the mass tort cases, simple
payouts from predetermined grids, no matter how fairly calculated,
will not be enough. If the current litigation system is to survive-and
I have elsewhere expressed my doubts about its basic operating
procedures and underlying theory51-adversarial processes may need
specializing in mass tort matters. Others would prefer a type of agency like the
Federal Emergency Management Agency. See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos
Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative Alternative?, 13
CARDOZO L. REv. 1819, 1823-24 (1992); Robert L. Rabin, Tort System on Trial
The Burden of Mass Toxics Litigation, 98 YALE L.J. 813, 827-28 (1989).
49. For a useful classification scheme of mass torts see McGovern, supra note
3, at 1853.
50. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Lit., No. CV92-P-
10000, MDL. No. 926, 1994 WL 114580 (N.D. Ala., Apr. 1, 1994) (approving a$4.225 billion settlement after a fairness hearing); In re Dow Corning Corp., No.
95-20512, 1997 WL 435029 (Bankr. E.D. Mich., July 29, 1997).
51. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5, 12-24 (1996).
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to take a page out of the learning of ADR processes.
At the macro or global level, judges who manage mass torts have
already begun using a variety of methods: to determine liability and
causation using expert science panels and special masters; to deter-
mine market share and claims allocation using statistical, economic,
and medical experts; to estimate the number and value of claims that
broaden the number of parties participating; and to change the struc-
ture and nature of legal proceedings. In such recent cases as the
breast implant litigation, Judge Pointer utilized committees repre-
senting subclasses of litigants to develop settlement proposals that
look more like coalitional negotiation processes52 than conventional
litigation.
With fuller participation by parties of various kinds, including
manufacturers, insurers, and experts, the modern mass tort looks lit-
tle like a contest between two litigants before a jury of peers. Rather,
it is a complex social and economic problem and the numbers of
players often defy court rules, not to mention courtroom architec-
ture. The liability and allocation issues often involve multiple par-
ties and multiple issues. It seems likely that the courts will have
much to learn from the multiparty facilitation and problem-solving
processes of mediators and public policy planners.'M
Already much has been learned and done in this area and a vari-
ety of new developments are pending, such as in breast implant sci-
ence hearings. While there is even more innovation to be applied at
the global level of problem-solving, I want to turn my attention to the
more human element-the level of individual justice within the mass
tort.
Too often in recent mass settlements-including consumer, in-
surance, banking, and product class actions, as well as mass torts-I
have noticed and have been uncomfortable with the simple applica-
52. See generally Gary Goodpaster, Coalitions and Representative Bargaining,
9 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. REsOL. 243 (1994) (discussing coalitional negotiation
processes).
53. In a recent mass tort case, I watched a contested argument on a motion
involving hundreds of lawyers representing defendants, claimants, insurers, un-
ions, intervenors, and public interest groups. Due to the numbers and confusing
alignments, most of the lawyers did not know where to sit. The alignments on
the motion crossed over the underlying alignments of the basic plaintiff-
defendant lawsuit. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 1162-64.
54. See e.g., ROGER SCHWARTZ, THE SKILLED FACILITATOR: PRACTICAL
WISDOM FOR DEVELOPING EFFECrIvE GROUPS 3-41 (1994); LAWRENCE
SUSSKIND & PATRICK FIELD, DEALING WITH AN ANGRY PUBLIC: THE MUTUAL
GAINS APPROACH TO RESOLVING DISPUTES 222-38 (1996).
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tion of monetary settlement grids. Such grids of cash payouts, de-
pending on the proof presented by individuals and the degree of in-
jury, may work well in cases that are only, at bottom, monetary. Ex-
amples of these grids can be found in the many class action securities
cases at the individual, if not at the aggregate level,5 and some con-
sumer cases.56 However, such grids will not satisfy those claimants
who have suffered serious bodily harm or feel the need to confront
the wrongdoer. *
In these cases we will need individualized hearings of some kind
in a manner that will require more direct human contact than a sim-
ple payment application to a claims administrator. Not all cases will
require such treatment and not all claimants within those categories
of cases with personal injury will require such processes. Neverthe-
less, I urge those who are crafting the mass settlements in mass
torts-as well as in some consumer, insurance fraud, and products li-
ability cases-to pay heed to the teachings of the empirical work that
has been done on procedural justice.58 Through this empirical work
55. In path-breaking empirical work, Janet Alexander has demonstrated that
in securities litigation, settlements are often effectuated on the basis of nuisance
or transaction costs that may compensate somewhat the injured plaintiffs and
their lawyers, but may fall short of tracking enforcement and compliance re-
quirements of the substantive law. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits
Matter?: A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497,
524-58 (1991). John C. Coffee, Jr., has also demonstrated the effects of lawyer
fee incentives on sub-optimal recoveries for both individual plaintiffs and larger
law enforcement goals. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the
Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 1343, 1373-75 (1995).
56. I once happily accepted a class action settlement of a bar review price-
fixing case, in which I was one of thousands of class members, that entitled me to
pick free books from the defendant Harcourt, Brace, & Jovanovich at a specified
and relatively small dollar amount, not unlike the recent settlement, by coupons,
in the airline industry price-fixing class action.
57. At least some Dalkon Shield litigants were more interested in face to face
apologies from A.H. Robins Company officials than monetary settlements. See
BACIGAL, THE LIMITs OF LITIGATION, supra note 4, at 125.
58. See E. LIND & TYLER, supra note 29, at 30-34 (demonstrating that people
are equally interested in process, as well as outcome); TOM R. TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, 115-24 (1990); E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Be-
holder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice Sys-
tem, 24 L. & SOC'Y REv. 953, 957-60 (1990) (reporting on a variety of studies
demonstrating that non-instrumental, expressive functions and values of process
are critical in litigants' assessments of the justice system and whether they have
been treated fairly). "People value the opportunity to state their views to a deci-
sion-maker regardless of the influence of those views on decision.. . ." TYLER,
supra, at 116. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 29, at 67-80 (reporting on
laboratory studies of perceptions of fairness in procedural variations). This is
known as the voice function of process. See Lucie E. White, Subordination,
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we have learned that voice or the ability to express one's claims mat-
ters and it matters a great deal in the assessment of fairness of a ju-
dicial system.
I learned from my work in the Dalkon Shield cases what Judge
Weinstein learned from his DES plaintiffs. 9 Even after settlements
have been reached, claimants still have a need to tell their harrowing
stories and to address the court with a reporter present in order to
achieve some closure on or catharsis about their case.' Some claim-
ants will not feel good about the justice system, no matter what the
financial outcome, unless they have a chance to tell their story, report
their pain, and in some cases, confront some representative of the
company that wronged them.61 Process matters to many and to some
it matters more than outcome. For others, the experience of a loss,
physical, emotional, psychic, or monetary, has deeply changed their
lives. In the human search for meaning, "meaning making" is often a
product of the claimant's narrative in a hearing.
It is obvious to all of us-lawyers, judges, and claimants-that in
these mass cases that affect thousands-and if the tobacco cases set-
tle, literally millions--of people, not everyone can be afforded a full
dress due process hearing in a court of law with. a judge and jury. In
the kind of sensitive cases that comprise many of women's health is-
sues, many individuals want to tell their story to some authoritative
figure, but not necessarily in a very public forum. Thus, ADR, and
an ADR of a very particular kind, may be an essential part of any
real satisfaction with the American judicial process. For those who
seek to establish claims facilities with simple grids and no opportuni-
ties for contest, appeal, or in-person confrontation with decision-
makers, there is likely to be some dissatisfaction with the process.
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G.,
38 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 3-5 (1990) (describing a welfare recipient's desire to tell her
own story in her own words at a welfare hearing).
59. See WEiNsTEiN, supra note 2, at 13.
60. See id.
61. In the case which began the "procedural revolution," the Supreme Court
recognized the differences between oral testimony and written evidentiary rec-
ords, and the importance in civil, as well as criminal, contexts of being able to
confront an adverse decision-maker. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-70
(1970). One of the lawyers who worked on Goldberg said:
[The case] was won on the facts. Plaintiffs told of dozens of stories
about individuals devastated by erroneous terminations of subsistence
aid.... The case was grounded in the real lives of ordinary poor people
and the pervasive meanness and incompetency of an ordinary bureauc-
racy. The facts sang.
Sylvia A. Law, Some Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly at Twenty Years, 56
BROOK. L. REv. 805, 807 (1990).
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For those who craft mass settlements, it is important to consider
what such a hearing process should look like. Many of the claimants
I saw in the Dalkon Shield proceedings simply wanted to tell their
story, while others wanted to renegotiate the settlement offers they
had rejected from the Trust. The fast-track arbitration process was
frustrating to these claimants and I protested early on, to no avail,
that the Trust reconsider and develop a more participatory mediation
process. A participatory process would have required different
training for the Trust representatives, who, though not lawyers, came
to arbitration hearings prepared to do adversarial battle with the
claimants. 2 Procedural justice research tells us that litigants care
about being treated fairly. Fairness matters so much that they will
rate satisfaction levels high even when they have not won' as long as
they perceive the process to be a good one, which thus far has meant
being able to present a case before a neutral third party.
Especially in cases such as the Dalkon Shield litigation, where so
many claimants were unrepresented, it may be particularly important
for claimants to participate in some kind of process rather than sim-
ply to fill out a settlement application form." Though I have not
62. This did not work for long in my court. To their credit, repeat-player
Trust representatives in my hearings quickly learned that haranguing or aggres-
sively cross-examining a claimant-whether she was entitled to relief or not-did
not help their case. A question I posed to the in-house counsel who trained the
Trust hearing representatives was why non-lawyers-many of the Trust represen-
tatives were nurses, or insurance representatives, or people with other valuable
expertise-had to be trained in such unnecessary practices for what was sup-
posed to be an informal hearing. Most of the Trust representatives that ap-
peared before me were women, generally much younger than the claimants,
which caused some confusion and dissatisfaction on the part of claimants. How
could a young(er) woman be the representative of the "evil" company who had
done this to them? Ironically, of course, since IUDs have been off the market
for so long, many of the Trust representatives could not have had any personal
experiences with its use, further complicating the gender issues in these cases.
63. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 29, at 184-86.
64. For those claimants who were represented, mass tort hearings presented
another kind of problem: that of the repeat-player lawyer. Of the many cases I
heard in several cities, there were two or three lawyers who handled the bulk of
the cases. In general the repeat-player lawyers were better prepared, knew how
to develop their cases, and ironically seemed to have better relations with their
clients. This was perhaps because offices specializing in such matters had devel-
oped a routine for client notification, counseling, and witness preparation. I es-
pecially would like to single out Daniel W. Dunbar, a 1981 graduate of Loyola of
Los Angeles Law School, for consistently excellent advocacy and for demonstrat-
ing good relations with clients.
On the other hand, the repeat-player representative faces a prisoner's di-
lemma game of sorts. It is virtually impossible to advocate equally hard for all
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systematically plumbed my records or memory for exact numbers,
there were many unrepresented claimants who represented them-
selves at least as well as, if not better than, some of the lawyers.65
Similarly, some of the trained lay advocates representing the Trust
were as good as the lawyers. Others were unnecessarily and ineffec-
tively adversarial.'
Claimants prepared their own exhibits and evidence. In the sin-
gle best presentation I witnessed, an unrepresented claimant ap-
peared with her recovered Dalkon Shield, saved from when it had
been expelled from her body, a blown up and professionally prepared
chart of the chronology of her injuries, illnesses, and operations, and
a prepared notebook of her medical records with a typewritten brief
and closing statement. At the conclusion of this hearing the claimant
told me she had prepared for this hearing as a "closure ceremony" so
claimants and maintain any credibility with the repeat-player decision-maker or
arbitrator. So in some cases, the repeat-player representative, in subtle ways,
begins to "defect." By reading the subtle cues from the questions asked or the
arguments made, I could tell when counsel knew some aspect of the case was
weak. One particularly caring counsel concluded all examinations of claimants
by asking his clients if they had anything else to add following formal direct ex-
amination. This was often a time when claimants told of the effects that the
Dalkon Shield had on their lives and for the things they knew they could not be
compensated. This allowed claimants to at least tell their story when it was clear
counsel had prepared them to know that such matters were either irrelevant or
not recoverable. Such additional material did not take me much more time to
listen to. However, a judge clearly would not have the time to allow all claimants
to do this.
65. At an impressionistic level, this confirms some of the more rigorous data
recently reported by Herbert M. Kritzer in his comparison studies of lawyers ver-
sus lay advocates in several administrative settings. See HERBERT M. KRITZER,
LEGAL ADVOCATES: LAWYERS AND NON-LAwYERs AT WORK (forthcoming
1998) (reporting that in some settings lay advocates may do as well or better than
lawyers).
66. Their ineffectiveness demonstrates the adage that a little knowledge is a
dangerous thing! In my most difficult case, the Trust representative heartlessly
pursued a totally ineffective cross-examination about irrelevant matters against
an unrepresented claimant. The claimant had her records improperly returned
to her by the Trust, which was dramatic evidence of very serious injuries. Her
four grown children had to testify to their mother's incapacity when they were
young as a result of her excessive pain and bleeding.
On the other hand, I vividly remember one hearing in which a Trust rep-
resentative broke down in tears herself when she heard the full facts of a claim-
ant's suffering and wisely refrained from unnecessary questioning.
Perhaps the strangest case involved a sophisticated former nurse and
women's health advocate who had assisted other women with their claims. She
appeared unrepresented and told a sad and convincing story of her own injuries,
but described what clearly was a non-Dalkon Shield IUD manufactured by an-
other company. Thus, she was not entitled to any compensation from the Trust.
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that regardless of what she was awarded at the hearing, she would fi-
nally be able to put this behind her and get on with her life.
Consider that for most claimants the facts in dispute occurred
over twenty years before the hearing, they had spent years trying to
locate often destroyed medical records, they had to reconstruct de-
tailed medical facts, and they had to relive incidents surrounding the
most emotional points of a woman's life. There were also male
claimants who testified about loss of consortium, loss of potential
children, their helplessness in the face of their loved one's pain or
bleeding, and their direct confrontation with and vicarious living of
the most intimate of a woman's experiences.
I report these few stories to demonstrate the human side of mass
torts and to urge those who craft mass tort processes to consider the
importance of retaining some process which permits narration, con-
frontation, and most importantly, the catharsis that can leave an in-jured person feeling somewhat ready to get on with their life, even if
not fully healed or empowered. Injured victims of our mass society
may require ceremonies, rituals, or procedural due process just as
much as the inhabitants of any foreign culture require the rituals
documented by visiting anthropologists. 7
Of course the one major difficulty with providing such a process
in all mass torts is cost. Due to the relatively low recovery amounts
awarded claimants in the Dalkon Shield fast-track arbitration pro-
gram and the relatively efficient administration of the program," the
Dalkon Shield litigation will likely be one of the first mass torts to
conclude by awarding proportional additional payments to claimants.
Not all limited fund cases, nor all settled consumer or mass torts
cases, will have the funds available to provide for formal ADR pro-
grams. Such programs are costly even if third party neutrals are paid
token amounts.69
Yet it seems to me that where claimants are more organized, ei-
67. See generally THE DISPUTING PROCESS-LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES (Laura
Nader & Harry F. Todd eds., 1978).
68. See Vairo, supra note 5, at 630-31.
69. There are sizable expenses in administering such programs, in locating
and paying for appropriate sites for hearings, in preparing and copying records,
in taping or transcribing proceedings, and in processing the decisions of reported
arbitration awards. Mediation might appear to be cheaper than arbitration due
to the absence of formal evidentiary hearings with records and the absence of
awards and prepared decisions. However, I have no doubt that mediations
would have taken longer and might have required further communications with
Trust principals and others to effectuate settlements.
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ther through victim support committees or through effective class ac-
tion representation, the question of whether to allocate some settle-
ment funds to develop such individualized ADR or other hearings, is
one for claimants to make. Such procedures offer the promise of
making mass tort cases more human again and demonstrate that at
least some form of access to justice may be available even if the full
court "press" of trial is not." As procedural justice research informs
us, a fair process before a third party neutral, whether a judge, arbi-
trator, or mediator, is likely to be better evaluated than the negoti-
ated settlements between lawyers and judges where the clients and
parties feel totally excluded from the process."If ADR is going to be used to make mass cases individual again,
70. I am not alone in arguing that ADR may be used in these larger cases to
increase access to justice by providing at least some form of recognizable process
through the formal justice system. See D. Brock Homby, Federal Court-Annexed
ADR: After the Hoopla, 7 FJC DIRECTIONS 26, 26-27 (1994). Examples of such
systems are found in court-approved processes with a sanctioned settlement
agreement or a supervised class settlement.
71. Much of the evaluation research on the use of different processes in tort
cases suggests that parties prefer processes they have participated in, including
court-mandated arbitration programs, over settlements effectuated by lawyers or
settlement conferences with lawyers and judges only, which are not visible to the
clients. See LIND ET AL., supra note 58, at 960-61; Deborah R. Hensler, What We
Know and Don't Know About Court-Administered Arbitration, 69 JUDICATURE
270, 276 (1986). Recently, there has been a great deal of controversy surround-
ing the studies of ADR in the RAND Corporation's, see JAMES KAKALIK ET AL.,
AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996), and the Federal Judicial Center's em-
pirical assessments of ADR in the courts, see DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., REPORT
TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND
CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ES-
TABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 (1997). The con-
troversy is whether or not ADR is actually a cost and delay savings device or
whether ADR promotes other values, such as participation, fairness, and a right
to be heard, which are much harder to study. It is clear that there are very high
satisfaction rates with ADR processes used in the courts. I will not resolve these
issues in this Article, but for my views see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dis-
pute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Profes-
sionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1922-30 & nn.243-79 (1997). We know very lit-
tle, in a rigorous empirical way, about the use of ADR outside of the court
setting. What all of the researchers and critics agree on is that we have little rig-
orous research on what values the high satisfaction rates express. High satisfac-
tion rates may go beyond cost and delay concerns, such as participation process
values and perhaps, in some cases, to more responsive and particularized solu-
tions. See Deborah R. Hensler, Puzzling Over ADR: Drawing Meaning from the
RAND Report, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1997, at 8; Francis E. McGovern,
Beyond Efficiency: A Bevy of ADR Justifications, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Summer
1997, at 12.
January 1998]
536 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:513
then the question of who will preside over these hearings becomes
even more important. It is to that delicate question I now turn.
III. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL
IN MASS TORTS?
A judge is either male or female and is of a particular race, class,
and social position; the appearance of neutrality, of evenhandedness,
of impartiality is false comfort.
-Judith Resnik7
[W]e treat the perspective of the person doing the seeing or
judging as objective, rather than as subjective. Although a person's
perspective does not collapse into his or her demographic character-
istics, no one is free from perspective, and no one can see fully from
another's point of view.
-Martha Minow73
[I]f background or sex or race of each judge were, by definition,
sufficient grounds for removal, no judge on this court could hear this
case, or many others, by virtue of the fact that all of them were attor-
neys, of a sex ....
-Judge Constance Baker Motley
7 4
"What does my being a woman specially bring to the bench? It
brings me and my special background. All my life experiences-
including being a woman-affect me and influence me... ." My
point is that nobody is just a woman or a man. Each of us is a person
72. Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations
for Our Judges, supra note 34, at 1908.
73. Martha Minow, Foreword.- Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10, 32
(1987).
74. Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(rejecting a recusal motion in a law firm sex discrimination case that asserted bias
because the judge was the same sex as the plaintiff); see also Commonwealth v.
Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 155, 157 (E.D.
Pa. 1974) (rejecting a recusal motion in a race discrimination case asserting bias
because the judge was the same race as the plaintiff).
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with diverse experiences. Each of us brings to the bench experiences
that affect our view of law and life and decision-making.
-Judge Shirley S. Abrahamson
If, however, "bias" and "partiality" be defined to mean the total
absence of preconceptions in the mind of the judge, then no one has
ever had a fair trial and no one ever will.... Interests, points of view,
preferences ... ] are the essence of living.
-Judge Jerome Frank76
Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall dis-
qualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might rea-
sonably be questioned .... He shall also disqualify himself...
[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the pro-
ceeding;
-28 U.S.C. § 455:' Disqualification of
justice, judge, or magistrate
I remember well when the first set of claimants entered my
hearing room7 and often commented on the fact that they were
75. Abrahamson, supra note 28, at 492-94.
76. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651-52 (2d Cir. 1943). See generally
JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1935) (discussing lay attitudes
towards lawyers and the legal profession); Frank, supra note 27, at 652-55(discussing a legal realist account of how judges actually decide cases and the im-
portance of personality and background in shaping judges' views).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994) (emphasis added). The statute itself is not ex-
pressed in gender neutral or at least gender inclusive terms. This section pro-
vides the rule for judicial disqualification by the judge. Another section of the
United States Code permits the filing of a recusal motion by counsel who seek to
challenge the impartiality of the judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1994). As commen-
tators have pointed out, the relation of these statutes to each other is less than
clear or uniformly applied. See John Leubsdorf, supra note 32, at 238. In mostjurisdictions, recusal motions are decided by the same judge against whom they
are filed. In some courts the chief judge or a motions judge may decide the re-
cusal motions for all the judges in the relevant court.
78. I held my hearings either in a small hearing room at the UCLA Law
School, designed for teaching students clinical advocacy courses and an interest-
ing sort of alternative dispute resolution site, or in a small office-like room in
participating federal courthouses, on both the west and east coasts. The signifi-
cance of the relative formality of site is important in order to communicate to
claimants that they are getting a serious, court-like setting for their individual
hearings.
I recently completed an empirical study of the court-annexed arbitration
program in the federal court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Regarding
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surprised and most often pleased to see a woman arbitrator. As the
numbers of my hearings increased, I placed a box of tissues next to
the tape recorder. This reflected the solemnity and the need for a re-
cord in a formal court hearing, together with a symbol of the psy-
chologist's or counselor's office that tears are perfectly acceptable in
this setting. As I have suggested in many settings, 9 our legal system
needs to include, both symbolically and realistically, the formality of
rules and fairness and the affective aspects of real human cases and
suffering. From the first hearing, recounting events from over twenty
years ago, when the claimant began to cry as she recounted the pain
and anguish of her Dalkon Shield experience, until the last retelling
of these tales, and for me some hundred cases later, I found myself
deeply moved by what had happened to these women and yet also
conscious of my role as an impartial and objective judge.
After years of advocacy before the Social Security Administra-
tion as a lawyer representing disability claimants, I knew of grids of
disability and degrees of pain. I was curious to see how I would
measure individual and comparative pain. Where, as in the Dalkon
Shield ADR program, there was a finite amount of money to be
awarded to claimants-a maximum of $20,000 to each claimant was
payable in this particular forum-aimost inevitably I created a com-
parative grid of injury, harm, and damage to be sure I was doing hori-
zontal equity across cases.o Although in social security disability
arbitration hearings, respondents overwhelmingly preferred the use of a court-
house hearing or conference room over private law offices. We need to repre-
sent the formality of the fairness of law in our architecture, but we could consider
different physical design layouts in both formal courtrooms and in other settings.
Some law schools have begun to develop more innovative hearing rooms.
Hearing rooms need to provide the symbolism of fairness and seriousness, but
they also need to make people feel comfortable while at the same time awed
enough to tell their truthful stories. The balance of formality, to encourage truth
telling and fairness, with informality, to minimize fear, is a difficult procedural
and architectural problem.
79. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:
Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 39(1985) (suggesting that the increased presence of women in the legal profession
might change some of the legal processes we use).
80. The best represented claimants had full documentation of their medical
expenses and hospitalizations, to the extent it was possible to retrieve them after
almost twenty years. Some had definitive proof of their Dalkon Shield use, ei-
ther through medical records or by producing the long-saved, crab-like objects.
Many claimants in the fast-track procedure, however, had little objective evi-
dence of their economic or physical damages. Often they did not know that their
own testimony was evidence and could be evaluated for credibility and for proof
of their claims. For all of us serving as arbitrators, assessments of credibility on
facts of injury, pain, and suffering had to be made in almost every case.
TAKING THE MASS OUT OF MASS TORTS
hearings, the conclusions to be reached by administrative law judges
are in some sense easier-where there are binary findings of eligible
disability or not-it may be possible to look only at the case at hand,
even though the grid system intends to provide for horizontal equity
there as well."'
I began occasionally to receive letters from claimants following
their hearings. Claimants received a written decision and opinion
with findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a statement of monetary
award if one was ordered. Their letters thanked me for my under-
standing, compassion, or kindness in letting them tell their story,
even in cases where claimants felt the money they received would
never really compensate them for what had happened. I wondered
whether my hearings were really any different from anyone else's.
During the first year of the program, the active arbitrators re-
ceived a few redacted sample opinions written by a number of us, but
it was not until some years into the program that we had several
meetings of arbitrators at the annual meeting of the Society of Pro-
fessionals in Dispute Resolution. These meetings were held to dis-
cuss common issues of procedure and judicial philosophy and to learn
more about what else was happening in the program. Over the years,
some of the repeat-player attorneys casually shared a perfectly le-
gitimate comment of comparison about the repeat-player judges be-
fore whom they appeared.'
Over the years of conducting these hearings, I wondered what
difference, if at all, my gender made, not only in potential out-
comes-I assume the PAC can rigorously analyze this since it has all
the aggregate data needed to study this question-but also in the
process or conduct of the hearings. I am, after all, a feminist legal
theorist. I have taught women's studies courses at UCLA. I have
been a women's rights litigator. I have written and spoken widely on
the question of whether women lawyers and women judges make a
81. In fact, empirical studies have demonstrated a lack of consistency in social
security disability findings in different regions. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Su-
preme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mat-
thews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHi. L.
REv. 28, 44-45 (1976-1977).
82. I was shocked to learn, for example, that one judge wrote his opinions on
his lap-top computer during the hearing. What that judge might defend as accu-
rate and efficient record keeping and fact-finding, I found insensitive to the need
for the judge to make eye contact with the witnesses and counsel, for both em-
pathic and instrumental credibility-assessment reasons.
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difference in the practice of law.' This set of issues is one which re-
mains deeply controversial.
I was and am troubled by an essentialist notion that only a
woman could truly understand these claims. This is, on its own terms,
a biologically determinist notion, which I have always rejected as a
totalizing explanation of gender subordination and difference.' Yet I
was struck, even at our arbitrator training session, by how many
questions my male colleagues asked me about female reproductive
organs after our gynecological training, that were deeply familiar and
known to me. How would these men evaluate pain, bleeding, and
pelvic inflammatory disease claims? How comfortable would a
claimant be telling these intimate details to a man who was not re-
lated to her?
I began each hearing by describing who I was and making sure I
had no conflicts of interests or disqualifying relations to the parties. I
was conscious of the fact that although I had never used an IUD, I
was, at the very time of the hearings, experiencing many of the same
medical procedures, for unrelated reasons, as the claimants before
83. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminization of the Legal Profession:
The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN SOcIETY 221
(Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1995); Menkel-Meadow, supra note
79; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What's Gender Got to Do with It?. The Politics and
Morality of an Ethic of Care, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 265 (1996).
84. I have most often written about social constructionist feminism within the
label of "difference feminism," a label others apply to me, see, e.g., Joan C. Wil-
lams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 797, 803 & n.17 (1989). The
harms of Dalkon Shield, DES, and breast implants are biologically and physically
gendered and challenge those who would claim all gendered effects are socially
constructed or politically structured. Indeed, like my colleague Robin L. West, I
believe that some portion of women's consciousness and standpoint philosophies
do turn on the biological reference points of women's bodies and their connec-
tions to others and to gender-specific harms. Menstruation, penetration, rape,
pregnancy, childbirth, miscarriage, breast-feeding, breast cancer, menopause,
pelvic inflammatory disease, ovarian and uterine cancers, and infertility are all
linked to women's bodies. Some of these have easier analogies to men's bodies
and male harms, and some are without commensurability. See Robin L. West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-3,28-35 (1988).
85. Of course, if personal experience with an injury or medical procedure is a
source of extrajudicial knowledge or bias, then no judge who has broken a leg or
had an operation could sit on even the most simple and common tort cases. Why
does it feel like a gendered tort carries a different weight? Am I conscious of the
sexist and racist claims for recusal made against female and black judges in sex
and race discrimination claims, as if men and whites had no gender or race in
deciding those cases? What is the measure of demographic/positional neutrality
or objectivity in a case which necessarily implicates one's demographic position?
Are neutrality and objectivity bad words to describe what we are trying to
achieve here?
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me had in the past." Of course, I also had endured some perfectly
86. I was undergoing fertility testing and had suffered a miscarriage at one
point during the years while I was hearing cases. Are these disqualifying events?
I do not think so. But they do dramatize the fact that all judges have either
shared the experiences of the litigants before them or they have not. Both expe-
riential perspectives may inform decision-making. I am sure, indeed certain, that
some of the male arbitrators had spouses or loved ones who had suffered some of
the same harms as the claimants. Were they any more or less neutral or biased
from this one-step removed perspective? Note that the federal disqualification
rules apply to financial, representative, fiduciary, or "any other interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding" of spouses and
other family members of the judge. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).
In a case that is currently pending, Judge Robert Jones, in the federal
court of Oregon, was asked to recuse himself in a breast implant litigation when
he revealed that his wife had breast implants, even though she had no problems
with them and was not complaining about them. See Plaintiffs' Motion to Dis-
qualify Judge Robert Jones, McAleer v. Medical Eng'g Corp., No. CV-97-10158-
2 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (requesting disqualification for reasons set forth in brief
which is filed under seal).
The filing attorneys believe that Judge Jones' statements indicate a per-
sonal interest and bias which affects his ability to be fair. The plaintiffs' attor-
neys believe that his statements about his wife's lack of complaints evidence a
personal bias against those who, by definition, have complained-the plaintiffs.
In that case the judge's wife is, by definition, a potential member of the class,
unless and until she "opts out." This gives the judge a rather obvious financial
interest in the larger litigation. He is the judge for all of the Oregon breast im-
plant cases.
Judge Jones' comments about "unknown out-of-state attorneys" who
raised the question may further evidence bias against the attorneys who made the
motion. This raises questions about who should decide disqualification motions.
See Leubsdorf, supra note 32, at 268-79; Resnik, Feminist Reconsiderations of the
Aspirations for Our Judges, supra note 34, at 1887-90. Another federal judge,
Judge Ancer Hagerty, denied the motion for recusal. The case was transferred to
the multidistrict venue of Alabama, before Judge Pointer, where the non-Dow
Coming breast implant cases remain.
If this case ever receives a full hearing on the merits, it will raise issues
about the personal bias and interest of judges who have formed views based on
their own or close family members' experiences. In this situation we have the
actual comments made by a judge about his views on his wife's experience, the
case before him, the recusal motion, and the attorneys who made the recusal
motion. Note also that this case exposes the difficulty of policing boundaries of
"personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding."
28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).
Before I heard the Dalkon Shield cases-as a law professor in my profes-
sional capacity-I had read many books and articles about the litigation so I had
knowledge, not of particular disputed evidentiary facts in individual cases, but of
the larger context in which these cases were situated. Compare this professional
and neutral acquisition of knowledge to that of Judge Kelly in In re School As-
bestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 778-81 (3d Cir. 1992), who attended a conference on
asbestos-caused injuries paid for by a plaintiffs' escrow fund and which utilized
plaintiffs' experts as speakers. At the time of the conference, Judge Kelly did not
know who had financed the event. He did not recuse himself upon learning this
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normal and ordinary, amount of pain and bleeding associated with
menstruation and reproductive functions. Was my position any bet-
ter-because I was able to empathize with some of the situations or
conditions the claimants suffered-or any worse-because I had ex-
perienced these things and knew how bad or trivial they really
were-than male arbitrators or female arbitrators who had not expe-
rienced any of these harms?
I cannot help but conclude that gender did matter in these cases,
but not necessarily in categorically pure ways. In the sample of
opinions we received from each other, it was clear that some male
arbitrators thought that even a little bit of excessive pain or bleeding
was a terrible thing to endure and awarded relatively high amounts of
damages, while others thought that some pain and bleeding was per-
fectly normal for any woman to endure. Some male arbitrators
seemed particularly moved by testimony of claimants. Others relied
more clinically on the evidence of medical texts presented by the
Trust.
Though the samples of opinions written by women arbitrators
were much smaller in the beginning, I noticed similar ranges. To the
extent that these early opinions revealed any differences, they were
clearly within and across genders and not between themY I hope
that it will be possible to do a more rigorous analysis of these issues
from the data available." The lawyers who often appeared in these
hearings would also be a good source of information, though they
themselves were predominantly male, as is the mass torts bar." Thus,
at least with respect to differences in outcomes, it would be possible
information but was disqualified by the Third Circuit. See id. at 785. As com-
mentators have noted, it is not entirely clear whether the applicable section pro-
hibiting personal bias or prejudice concerning a party applies only to actual bias
or to perceived or apparent bias. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHics 580 (4th ed. 1995).
87. This is a point that equality feminist scholars in law, sociology, and psy-
chology have been making for years: that average ranges within genders are
greater than the differences between genders on most measures of achievements
and most attributes. See CYNTIA F. EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DIsTINCrIONs 83-87
(1988); CAROL TAVRJS, THE MISMEASURE OF WOMAN 295 (1992).
88. Since all opinions and awards were confidential and sent only to the par-
ties and the administering PAC, only the PAC will have access to the relevant
data. Fortunately, the board of the PAC includes several very experienced so-
ciolegal researchers from the Duke faculty, including Neff Vidmar, Tom
Metzloff, and now E. Allan Lind.
89. The breast implant litigation is the first mass tort I have seen with signifi-
cant female attorney representation. It will be interesting to track, in the future,
whether women's health tort victims are more likely to seek female attorneys
when they have more of an option to do so.
TAKING THE MASS OUT OF MASS TORTS
to determine if there were any gender differences by decision-
makers.'
Since I cannot comment on the aggregate data of outcome dif-
ferences and have not had the opportunity to view other arbitrators'
hearings in a systematic way, my views about differences in process
or outcome are just that-my own views. I cannot help but continue
to suggest, as I have for many years, that the process provided by
women arbitrators in this program was likely more sensitive to the
needs of the claimants9 and provided some of the advantages of an
90. The rich literature on differences in male and female judging have pro-
duced very few empirically verified outcome differences. See generally David W.
Allen & Diane E. Wall, The Behavior of Women State Supreme Court Justices:
Are They Tokens or Outsiders?, 12 JUST. SYS. J. 232 (1987) (stating that women
Supreme Court Justices adopt an outsider role); David W. Allen & Diane E.
Wall, Role Orientations and Women State Supreme Court Justices, 77 JUDI-
CATURE 156 (1993) (discussing the differences between female and male Su-
preme Court Justices); Elaine Martin, The Representative Role of Women Judges,
77 JUDICATURE 166 (1993) (discussing the representation of women's interests
by women justices); see, e.g., Beverly B. Cook, Sentencing Behavior of Federal
Judges: Draft Cases-1972, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 597, 620-30 (1973); John Gruhl et
al., Women as Policymakers:' The Case of Trial Judges, 25 AM. J. POL. Sci. 308
(1981) (discussing the small differences in male and female sentencing); Herbert
M. Kritzer & Thomas M. Uhlman, Sisterhood in the Courtroom: Sex of Judge
and Defendant in Criminal Case Disposition, 14 Soc. Sci. J. 77, 83 (1977) (finding
there are no differences in male and female judges); Thomas G. Walker & Debo-
rah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench. Policy and Process
Ramifications, 47 J. POL'Y 596, 598 (1985) (looking at female and black federaljudges appointed by the Carter administration); see also Sue Davis, Do Women
Judges Speak "In a Different Voice?": Carol Gilligan, Feminist Legal Theory and
the Ninth Circuit, 8 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 143 (1993) (analyzing the opinions of the
Ninth Circuit on equal protection); Sue Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender
on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129 (1993); Elaine Martin, Gender
and Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the Reagan and Carter Administrations,
71 JUDICATURE 136, 138 (1987) (discussing Reagan's poor performance in ap-
pointing female federal judges); Peter McCormick, Do Women Judges Make a
Difference?: An Analysis by Appeal Court Data, 8 CAN. J.L. & SoC'Y 135 (1993).
In male-only appeal panels, fathers seeking custody of their children fared
better than when appeal panels were of mixed gender. One gender bias task
force has found some gender related outcomes. See Lynn H. Schafran, Sympo-
sium, Women and the Law: Goals for the 1990s, 42 FLA. L. REv. 181, 191 (1990);
see also KRITZER, supra note 65 (discussing gender differences in labor grievance
arbitrations).
91. An often heard theme in the hearings was how many male gynecologists
had been particularly uncaring about the physical symptoms associated with the
Dalkon Shield. Claimant after claimant testified that when she complained
about excessive pain or bleeding, doctors just told them it was normal and they
would "get used to it." Though the principal blame for the Dalkon Shield deba-
cle has been placed on the manufacturer and the incorrect and incomplete mate-
rials sent to treating physicians, there remains a separate concern about the role
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ADR-like forum. This is ironic, because so many feminists decry the
use of ADR in at least some settings? The informality of these
ADR processes allowed for a more informal, conversational, and
narrative presentation of cases, without the embarrassment and glare
of a public court room. Further, the process took place in a setting
where the ultimate decision-makers were more reflective of the
claimant population and demographics, and perhaps did have some
greater empathic understanding of the injuries suffered.
of treating physicians and their continued use of a device that was clearly causing
pain and injury. See SOBOL, supra note 4, at 8-22 (discussing how the physicians
managed to remove themselves from most of the litigation).
92. See, e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the
Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441, 445 (1992) (criticizing mediation as a re-
treat from the stiffer laws of the courtroom); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alter-
native: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1549 (1991) (arguing
that mandatory mediation is more damaging to women); Lisa G. Lerman, Me-
diation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution
on Women, 7 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 72 (1984) (discussing the weaknesses in
mediation procedures).
93. The recent study of comparative procedures in small claims courts in New
Mexico lends some support to the notion that participants find processes more
satisfactory or fair when there is some demographic matching of decision-makers
and parties. See MICHELLE HERMAN ET AL., METRO COURT STUDY (1995);
Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants' Ethnicity and Gender
on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 L. & SOC'Y
REV. 767, 784-88 (1996). To note the other side of the gender divide in the con-
troversies about matching in ADR, I recently excluded myself from considera-
tion as an arbitrator in a sports salary dispute because I felt that I did not have
adequate extrajudicial knowledge of the sport. I know that many of my male
colleagues, who care deeply about this sport, would have given their eyeteeth to
arbitrate this case. This is not to say that I would disqualify myself from all male
sports or that another woman arbitrator would not feel perfectly competent to
decide such a case.
The issues of demographic or other forms of matching are far more com-
plex in ADR than in adjudication. In arbitration, parties often choose partisan
arbitrators who are supposed to have extrajudicial knowledge and contacts, such
as in labor arbitration. In addition, parties choosing both arbitrators and media-
tors often seek those with expertise and knowledge of both the subject matter
and sometimes even the parties. I know that in some cases I have been chosen as
an arbitrator precisely because the parties or their lawyers wanted a woman, for
whatever complicated reasons of empathy, perceived and accepted partiality, or
acceptability to both sides. Query whether court-annexed programs allowing
party choice of third party neutrals could, under the rubric of state action, accede
to requests for female, black, or Hispanic neutrals? For some early studies de-
scribing the differences in male and female mediation styles see Charity B.
Gourley, Mediator Differences in Perception of Abuse: A Gender Problem?, in
CONFLICt AND GENDER 73, 81-82 (Anita Taylor & Judi Beinstein Miller eds.,
1996), Shiela Heen, Defining Gender Differences-Is the Proof in the Process?,
12 NEGOTIATION J. 9, 14-16 (1996), and Helen Weingarten & Elizabeth Douvan,
Male and Female Visions of Mediation, 1 NEGOTIATION J. 349 (1985).
TAKING THE MASS OUT OF MASS TORTS
It has always struck me as somewhat ironic that some of the
critical race theorists, who argue most for the narrative method in le-
gal studies, have also criticized ADR's informalism. It is those very
informal processes that are most likely to permit narrative discourse
and case presentation.'
Aside from gender, the use of the Dalkon Shield is also an inter-
esting class story. The use of the Dalkon Shield crossed class lines.
There were affluent middle-class women and university students, as
well as working women and welfare mothers, who were all seeking to
control their reproductive lives. Thus, there was a sense in these
cases of a unified "women as a class" interest. At the same time,
class often asserted itself in representational strategies. Poorer
women were much more likely to proceed pro se, or to have never
consulted a lawyer except at the beginning of their cases.'
Mediation would have been my ideal process in this kind of case,
so that the claimants would have had an opportunity, ideally assisted
by counsel, to act and participate in the assessment of their claim and
its value. However, I understand that in limited fund cases, settling
defendants fear that mediated solutions may be less predictable. 6 To
the extent that mediators facilitate, rather than decide, cases and the
parties exercise more control, some would say we need to worry less
about the distance, objectivity, or neutrality of the third party
94. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk
of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIs. L. REv. 1359, 1387-89
(1985); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2437-41 (1988).
95. The Dalkon Shield case is significant for legal ethics and client solicitation
reasons as well. This was one of the first mass torts to have been advertised by
lawyers seeking clients who had been injured. See Zauderer v. Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 629-31 (1985). The attorneys soliciting Dalkon
Shield cases were instrumental in constitutional challenges to limits on lawyer
advertising. After the A.H. Robins bankruptcy filing, there was national adver-
tising, advising potential claimants to file with the bankruptcy court. Obviously,
class played a large role in access to counsel, even given the contingent fee used
by most plaintiffs' counsel.
96. I am not persuaded by this. Evaluation experts are employed to predict
the value of future claims from samples of litigated or settled cases. Stratified
samples of cases could just as easily have been subjected to mediated treatment
with agreed-upon "caps." Also, predictive values could have been assessed from
such samples, as have been used with respect to other claim valuation processes.
It is, of course, somewhat ironic that some plaintiffs' advocates fear mediation
because they presume there will be a compromise, while defendants fear media-
tion as being too unpredictable and perhaps more costly in time. There is virtu-
ally no empirical evaluation of differences among the variety of ADR processes
to rigorously assess these claims.
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neutraf in a mediation setting.
Ultimately the question of what is appropriate neutrality or im-
partiality in judging cases remains much more problematic for me
than the current statutory requirements. As Duncan Kennedy98 and
Judge Patricia Wald have both realized from analytical, jurispru-
dential, and practical bases, judging is constrained by our commit-
ments to rules of law and fairness. Judging is further fettered by
some aspiration for impartiality and neutrality, even if every individ-
ual has at least a demographic, if not a substantive or ideological
positionality" with respect to any particular case."1 As my colleague
and talented mediator, Howard Gadlin, has said, we hold some no-
tion of neutrality, objectivity, or impartiality over our head, like an
unreachable halo to remind us of what we need to aspire to, as we
work on cases situated before us, where we are grounded in who we
are.'°2 As both Judge Wald and Duncan Kennedy have noted, there
97. For others the question of how neutral, distanced, or impartial the third
party neutral is does not depend on the particular process, but on what control
the parties have over the choice of the neutral. If the parties choose their arbitra-
tor or mediator, the emphasis will be on disclosure and consent so that parties
can, if they want, opt for someone who is not impartial at all. This issue is cur-
rently very important in ADR ethics, as parties often desire a third party neutral
with great expertise in a subject but who may be quite enmeshed with all the
parties. This is not unlike the choice of a village elder or "the big man" in
choosing a third party, who is deeply enmeshed in the community in which the
dispute occurs, to resolve a case. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COM-
PARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 6 (1981). This kind of enmeshed third
party neutral selection is quite common in intellectual property disputes where
parties seek someone who understands the technology and the law. This third
party may have some past or present relation, if not to the particular disputants
then to the larger industry or practice in which the dispute is located. See Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No An-
swers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L.
REv. 407,443-44 (1997).
98. See generally Kennedy, supra note 32, at 558-62 (describing the relation ofjudges' demographic and political views to the decision-making process).
99. See generally Wald, Women in the Law: Stage Two, supra note 28, at 49(recognizing the particularities of women's position as a judge and the objective
constraints of the law).
100. In addition to Martha Minow, supra note 73, many legal scholars have
noted our inevitable positions or commitments-demographic, ideological, or, as
the statute says, personal interests-that color or filter how we view the world
and interpret facts. See Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 829, 835 (1990); Howard Lesnick, The Wellsprings of Legal Responses to
Inequality: A Perspective on Perspectives, 1991 DuKE L.J. 413, 413-20 (1991).
101. See Lesnick, supra note 100, at 413-20.
102. See generally Howard Gadlin & Elizabeth W. Pino, Neutrality: A Guidefor the Organizational Ombudsperson, 13 NEGOTIATION J. 17 (1997).
TAKING THE MASS OUT OF MASS TORTS
is really often only a small place within the constraints of the legal
process and rules where discretion or creative interpretation allows a
fuller expression of what one really values in lawmaking.1" This may
apply particularly in the context of adjudication, and most particu-
larly in constitutional adjudication, where laws are interpreted and
new meanings created."°
Yet in the context of arbitrating or mediating tort cases, it is
more often fact-finding or fact-listening, rather than lawmaking that
engages the capacities of third party neutrals. The law is settled in
most cases in which ADR is used, either by settlement, judicial de-
cree, or avoidance. Thus, I wonder whether the literature on judicial
neutrality, disqualification, and decision-making has paid sufficient
attention to the differences in the various kinds of judicial functions.
Is neutrality or impartiality different for lawmaking or law interpre-
tation than for fact-finding? 5 We may need to reconceptualize both
the philosophical underpinnings and the statutory provisions for ju-
dicial standards of impartiality, lack of bias, neutrality, and disqualifi-
cation. What makes for a good, distanced, and neutral judge in one
context may not make a caring and empathic listener in a different
sort of proceeding. Should standards for neutrality or impartiality be
different in ADR than in formal adjudication?'O' Are different
103. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
104. For example, would a Supreme Court comprised of more women have
defined the "liberty interest" in Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18
(1981), to include the termination of parental rights? See id. at 59 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing property rights derived from the parent-child relation-
ship).-
105. Both law interpretation and fact-finding are constitutive of judicial func-
tions and expertise, but they may call on the different skills, capacities, and as-
pects of who we are. See Frank, supra note 27, at 655.
106. The CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR,
which I chair, is currently drafting proposed rules and crafting position papers on
these important issues. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restate-
ment of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10
GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS (1997). Some suggest that arbitrators should be covered
by the same rules as judges-both the relevant statutes and the Judicial Code of
Conduct-because their roles as decision-makers over the case are so similar,
while mediators should be governed by more disclosure and consent rules since
they have less power over the parties. To the extent that mediators are now of-
ten very active in evaluating cases, as well as facilitating them, it is not clear to
me that mediators should be held to a different standard. Indeed, mediators may
often be privy to more confidential information in the form of sensitive settle-
ment facts that are not typically revealed in hearing settings. Nevertheless, third
party neutral disclosure and consent may be an adequate protection here and, it
could provide for greater choice and disclosure than the current statutory and
ethical schemes provide, with greater party acceptance of the neutrals they have
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competencies required?
Where the constitutional adjudicator may need to be distanced
from the parties in a particular dispute, and be wise at considering
the larger policy and external effects on parties outside of a dispute in
deciding a question of important constitutional or interpretative mo-
ment," the mass tort arbitrator or mediator may need to have an
ability to relate to claimants interpersonally, to listen well, and yes to
empathize, as well as to find facts. To this extent, mass tort ADR
provides the possibility for the kind of legal empathy that I"~ and
many others have argued for, as seen in Lynne Henderson's
"empathy,"' Robin L. West's "caring justice," and Martha Nuss-
baum's "love's knowledge" or "poetic justice.'. By providing a
closer, more intimate and interpersonal connection with a legal pro-
ceeding, an ADR proceeding-if conducted in a manner providing
the opportunity to express the fullness of the harms and the need for
catharsis described by Judge Weinstein and others"--offers the po-
tential for allowing the expression of individual pain within the con-
text of a mass tort.
I have been persuaded by Robin L. West 3 that if women's he-
donic lives and injuries are currently underexpressed and undercom-
pensated for' in the recognition that traditional tort law has allowed
and the process that traditional adjudication has permitted them to
be expressed in, then gender does matter. To the extent that I con-
tinue to feel that gender has something of a role to play here, the em-
pathic processes with the greater potential for narrative in ADR are
a powerful tool for their expression.' 5
had a hand in choosing.
107. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 131-62 (1991).
108. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Power of Narrative in Empathetic
Learning: Post-Modernism and the Stories of Law, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 287,
304-07 (1992).
109. See Lynne N. Henderson, The Dialogue of Heart and Head, 10 CARDOZO
L. REV. 123, 123 (1988); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH.
L. REv. 1574, 1576 (1987).
110. See generally WEST, supra note 14.
111. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LovE's KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON
PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 53-78 (1990); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC
JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995) (arguing forjudicial decision-making that combines the knowledge of the heart, which is situ-
ated in cultural contexts and inspired by literature and narrative, with the legal
rational knowledge of the head and rules).
112. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 13.
113. See West, supra note 15.
114. See WEST, supra note 14, at 82.
115. In my brief experience in the breast implant litigation, it became clear to
TAKING THE MASS OUT OF MASS TORTS
None of this, of course, speaks to the bigger questions implicated
in any mass tort, and any mass tort with gender specific harms. What
harms should substantively be recognized? What are fair compensa-
tory amounts? What other remedies should be granted?... However,
I do come away from the Dalkon Shield experience believing that if
the larger justice questions can be dealt with, then ADR processes-
with tissue boxes" as well as tape recorders, with heart as well as
head-can provide an individualized hearing to those people who
want it, and can take the mass out of mass torts.
me just how important the process is. Those designing the process by which po-
tential claimants would be counseled and apprised of their legal rights were sen-
sitive enough to seek skilled female ADR professionals to assist them in design-
ig the process. How this might play out in concerns about gender
discrimination in formal court or court adjunct appointments is a separate ques-
tion I am ducking at the moment. At the same time, I noted that insensitive male
attorneys who had worked on this case for years described the settlement struc-
ture as a "top-down" grid, without even realizing how insensitive these words
were in the context of the subject matter of the litigation.
116. The Dalkon Shield settlement program included an emergency fertility
program for those women nearing the end of their active fertility periods. Breast
implant settlement proposals, as well as some asbestos proposals, include pro-
grams for some medical monitoring.
117. With all the harms that befall injured people, and particularly women in
our society, claimants may need to cry as well as narrate in their hearings. If
crying about our pain illustrates just how bad our situations are, then some may
prefer a private setting for the expression of their grief and pain.
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